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Abstract 
One of the major issues in the analysis of unemployment durations concerns the 
distinction between state dependence (i.e., duration dependence of the exit 
rate out of unemployment for a given individual) and unobserved heterogeneity. 
Empirical studies rely heavily on functional form restrictions, which may be 
hazardous. This paper presents nonparametric eyeball tests for both phenomena. 
By examining features of graphs and tables of aggregate duration data, one can 
detect in a simple way whether there is evidence for state' dependence and/or 
unobserved heterogeneity, without the need to make parametric assumptions. The 
tests are applied to data from several European countries. 
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1. Introduction. 
In the past decade, the econometrie analysis of unemployment durations has 
become widespread. One of the major issues in this literature concerns the 
distinction between state dependence of the hazard rate (i.e. dependence of 
the exit rate out of unemployment for a given individual on his elapsed 
duration of unemployment) and unobserved heterogeneity (for surveys, see for 
example Devine & Kiefer (1991)). Of ten, there is reason to believe that for a 
given individual the hazard rate decreases as a function of duration. For 
example, there may be stigma effects reducing the number of job opportunities 
for the long-term unemployed (see e.g. Vishwanath (1989) and Van den Berg 
(1991)). On the other hand, the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the 
distribution of the duration variable causes the hazard rate of the 
distribution of observed durations to decrease as well. This follows from the 
fact that on average individuals with the largest hazard rate leave 
unemployment first. Obviously, from a policy point of view, it is important to 
know the relative importance of state dependence (also called genuine duration 
dependence) on the one hand, and unobserved heterogeneity on the other. For 
example, if state dependence is the dominant factor, then efforts may be 
concentrated on the long-term unemployed, while otherwise it may be useful to 
screen short-term unemployed and concentrate efforts on those with bad 
characteristics. Also, the degree of state dependence is of importance for 
macro analyses of the labour market (see e.g. Layard, Nickell & Jackman (1991) 
and Jackman &: Savouri (1992)). However, since both factors affect the hazard 
rate in a similar way, it seems to be hard to distinguish empirically between 
them. 
In the present paper we present nonparametric eyeball tests that can be 
used to detect whether there is state dependence and/or unobserved 
heterogeneity. So-called eyeball tests are based on easy-to-detect 
characteristics of data summarized in graphs and tables. By examining 
particular characteristics, one can detect in a simple way whether there is 
evidence for (one of) these phenomena, without the need to make parametric 
assumptions. The tests are designed to be applicable to discrete-time 
time-series data on aggregate outflows from different unemployment duration 
classes. Aggregate (or gross, or macro) data have the advantage that they 
provide the exact values of the exit probabilities for the different duration 
classes considered (averaged over unobserved heterogeneity). It should be 
noted from the outset that eyeball tests are not tests in the usual 
statistical sense. Rather, they are useful as preliminary informal checks. 
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We examine in detail one of the two eyeball tests for state dependence 
proposed by Jackman & Layard (1991), and an eyeball test for unobserved 
heterogeneity based on Van den Berg & Van Ours (1993). We present assumptions 
under which they are sensible tests and characterize cases in which they are 
likely to result in rejection of the null hypothesis. Further, we show that 
another test for state dependence in Jackman & Layard (1991), which was first 
proposed by Budd, Levine & Smith (1988), and which is rather popular, has 
unattractive properties. We also outline how the ideas underlying the eyeball 
tests could be transferred to a continuous-time micro-econometric framework. 
The eyeball tests do not rely on parametric assumptions on the 
determinants of the hazard. This is a marked advantage. Intuitively, it is 
clear that in parametric analyses the results on the degree of state 
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity may be extremely sensitive with 
respect to misspecification of the corresponding parts of the model (see e.g. 
Ridder (1987) for some evidence). 
Section 2 presents the model framework and the type of data needed to 
perform the eyeball tests. Basically, the model is a Mixed Proportional Hazard 
(MPH) model in which calendar time replaces the role of the observed 
explanatory (x) variables. In Section 3 the tests are examined. Section 4 
contains empirical illustrations. We use data from France, the UK and The 
Netherlands. Section 5 concludes. 
2. The model. 
In this section we present the unemployment duration model and the underlying 
assumptions. We use two measures of time. The variable t denotes the duration 
of unemployment, as measured from the moment the individual becomes 
unemployed. The variable r denotes calendar time, which has its origin 
somewhere in the past. For simplicity we take t and r to have the same 
measurement scale, apart from the difference in origin. Both t and r are 
discrete variables. As an example, consider an individual who is unemployed 
for t periods at calendar time r. If he fails to leave unemployment in period 
t, he will be unemployed for t+1 periods at calendar time r+1. 
Ideally, aggregate data give the total numbers of individuals in the labor 
market who are unemployed for t periods of time (£=0,1,2,...) at calendar 
times r , r+1, r+2, e tc . By comparing the number of individuals who are 
unemployed for t periods of time at r to the number unemployed for M-l periods 
at r+1, we observe the exit probability out of unemployment at calendar time r 
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for duration t. In other words, we observe the conditional probability that an 
individual leaves unemployment when being unemployed for t periods, when 
calendar time equals r at the moment of exit, for different values of t and r. 
In the model, t is endogenous, whereas r is an explanatory variable, in 
the sense that the exit probability out of unemployment for individuals with 
duration t may vary over calendar time. Thus, calendar time is assumed to 
capture cyclical macro effects on individual exit probabilities out of 
unemployment as well as structural changes influencing these probabilities. 
The model explains variations in unemployment duration distributions in 
terms of observed and unobserved individual characteristics, calendar time, 
and the state dependence pattern. Usually, gross data do not contain 
information on individual characteristics that could be used as explanatory 
variables. At best, gross figures are collected separately for a few different 
groups of individuals. In the sequel we will therefore suppress the 
conditioning on the prevailing value of observed explanatory variables. 
We assume that all variation in the exit probabilities out of unemployment 
can be explained by the prevailing unemployment duration t and calendar time r 
and by unobserved heterogeneity across individuals. We denote the unobserved 
heterogeneity variable by v. Consider an individual with unobserved 
characteristics v who is unemployed for t periods when calendar time equals r. 
We denote the conditional probability that this individual leaves unemployment 
af ter t periods of unemployment by 6(t\r,v). By definition, this is the exit 
probability out of unemployment (or hazard) at t conditional on r and v. The 
unemployment duration density conditional on calendar time and conditional on 
v can be constructed from these exit probabilities. For example, the 
probability that unemployment duration equals t, when calendar time was r-t at 
the moment of inflow into unemployment, conditional on v, equals 
t - ï 
9(t\r,v) . n (1 - 9(i\T-t+i,v)) (2.1) 
i = 0 
for all ie{0,l,..}. We take the product term to be one if t=0. 
We make the following assumptions. 
Assumptions 
1. MPH: 6(t\r,v) has a mixed proportional 
there are functions ^ and ip2 s u c n t n a t 
B{t\r,v) = ^(t).^2(T).v 
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hazard specification, i.e. 
(2.2) 
with tpx and tp2 positive and uniformly bounded from above. Further, 
the distribution of v is such that, for every t and r, 
Pr(0<8{t\r,v)<l) = 1. 
2. Independence of v and r: v does not depend on the moment of inflow 
into unemployment and does not change during unemployment. 
3. Variation over calendar time: the function ip2 is n o t constant. 
If Vi is constant then there is no state dependence. If the distribution of v 
is degenerate then there is no unobserved heterogeneity. 
Assumption 1 is similar to the Standard MPH assumption in reduced-form 
duration models for micro duration data (see Lancaster (1990) for an extensive 
survey of such models). In models for micro duration data, dependence on 
calendar time is usually ignored, and the role of r in the model above is 
replaced by the role of observed explanatory variables x. Eibers & Ridder 
(1982) prove that the latter type of models are nonparametrically identified 
if assumptions similar to above are satisfied. In particular, state dependence 
and unobserved heterogeneity can be distinguished empirically. 
An important difference between the present model and these MPH models for 
micro duration data is that here we have discrete time, whereas in micro 
studies time is usually treated as continuous. Because of this, we had to 
introducé the last line of Assumption 1. Note that it implies that the support 
of v is bounded. This in turn implies that all moments of v exist. 
The present model should be regarded as a flexible accounting device for 
discrete time data, with an appealing interpretation. Later on we show how the 
eyeball tests can be used to infer whether the model specification is correct. 
The first part of Assumption 2 states that the distribution of v in the 
inflow is the same whatever the moment of inflow. So, it rules out that there 
are cohort effects in the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term. 
There is abundant evidence that the season at the moment of inflow influences 
the unemployment duration (see e.g. Van den Berg & Van Ours (1994)). A 
possible explanation for this is that the composition of the inflow, as far as 
unobserved characteristics are concerned, varies over the seasons. This would 
violate Assumption 2. We ignore this issue in the theoretical analysis in this 
paper, while in the empirical illustration we seasonally adjust the data. 
Assumption 3 is similar to the assumption in Eibers & Ridder (1982) that 
there is dispersion of observed explanatory variables. Note that sufficiënt 
for Assumption 3 is that there is a data point r0 somewhere in the time series 
such that ip2(T)=ai f ° r T<To a n ^ ip2(T)=a2 f ° r r ^ r o- ^n t n a t c a s e w e have two 
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steady states. 
As mentioned above, the data provide observations on the conditional 
probabilities that individuals leave unemployment when being unemployed for t 
periods, when calendar time equals r at the moment of exit, for different 
values of t and r. These probabilities are unconditional on the unobserved 
heterogeneity term v, and will be denoted by 9(t\r). To express these observed 
exit probabilities 9(t\r) in terms of the exit probabilities 9(t\r,v), we have 
to integrate v out of the latter. Let t denote the random unemployment 
duration, and t lts realization. We have that 
B(t\T\ - Pr(t = t\T) = Zv(Pr(t = t\T,v)) 
WW - p r ( t > £|-r) - Ev(Pr(t>t\r,v)) [Z-Ó} 
in which Pr(t = t\T,v) and Pr(t>t\T,v) can be expressed in terms of 8{t\T,v) 
(note that equation (2.1) gives Pr{t = t\r,v)). By doing this, and by 
substituting equation (2.2), we get 
t -1 
ipx{t).ip2{T). E„ v- II [1 ~ n(i)-^2{r-t+i).v] 
i = 0 9{t\r) = — ^ (2.4) 
E„ 
t - ï 
H [1 - ^ 1( i ) .^ 2(r-«+z) .-y] 
i = 0 
To avoid confusion, note that even though £ enters the argument of ij)2 m 
(2.4), •f2 is a function of calendar time only. From (2.4) it follows that 
9(t\r) can be expressed in terms of the "structural functions" tpu ip2 a n d the 
distribution function G(v) of v. We denote Et,(,yI) by fit. 
3. Eyeball tests . 
3.1. Jackman Sc Layard (1991)'^ "stock/flow" eyeball test for state dependence. 
It should be noted from the outset that the exposition below is more formal 
than in Jackman & Layard (1991). For the eyeball test to be sensible we have 
to strengthen Assumption 3 and add another assumption, 
3'. Steady states: there are at least two calendar time intervals 7\ such 
that V>2(T)=ai f ° r TeTi and a^a,- for i^j. Ti is so large that it 
contains points such that all individuals who are unemployed at such 
a point have entered unemployment during 7\ and will exit 
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unemployment during 7\. For the cohorts entering and leaving 
unemployment in 71,- the mean unemployment duration is finite. 
4. Constant inflow: the inflow rate into unemployment for individuals 
with characteristics v does not depend on calendar time except 
possibly for the value of ip2(T)-
Thus, we have (at least) two steady states. If T1 and T2 are sufficiently 
large and if Assumptions 1 and 2 are valid then it is not difficult to check 
whether the first part of Assumption 3' is true. It implies that for each 
cohort entering unemployment just after the beginning of Tt the observed 
unemployment distribution must be the same, while the distribution for cohorts 
entering just after the beginning of 7\ must differ from the distribution for 
cohorts entering just after the beginning of T2. 
Assumption 4 is similar to the Standard "constant inflow rate" assumption 
made in empirical analyses of duration data from stock samples (see e.g. 
Heekman & Singer (1984) and Ridder (1984)). Note that it refers to the size of 
the inflow, whereas Assumption 2 refers to the composition of the inflow. 
Assumption 4 implies that within a steady state the inflow rate is constant. 
So, if data on the inflow size are available then this assumption can be 
checked as well. 
The eyeball test is based on the ratio of the observed exit probability 
for the newly unemployed and the observed over-all exit probability in the 
stock of unemployed. Specifically, it compares this ratio for one steady state 
to the ratio for others. Consider a steady state. Because of Assumption 3', we 
may replace r in the exit probabilities at r by the value a of ip2 in that 
steady state, if r is a point of time satisfying the second part of Assumption 
3'. (So, for example, we may replace 9(t\r,v) by 9(t\a,v). Note however that r 
is observed while a is unobserved. The last part of Assumption 3' can now be 
written as E(t\a)«x>.) From (2.4), the observed exit probability for the newly 
unemployed equals 
ö(0|'o) = ^(OJ-o./*! (3.1) 
Let p denote the elapsed duration of unemployment of individuals in the 
stock of unemployed at a certain point of time. Consider a point of time 
satisfying the second part of Assumption 3'. We want to know the observed 
over-all exit probability in the stock of unemployed at that point of time. We 
denote this probability by ~B(a). It equals the proportion of individuals 
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unemployed at that point who leave unemployment within one time period. This 
in turn equals the sum over all values of p of the probability that the 
elapsed duration of unemployment p equals p and the residual duration r equals 
zero, conditional on presence in the stock of unemployed at that particular 
point of time. From results in for example Heekman & Singer (1984) and Ridder 
(1984) it can be inferred that under Assumptions 1, 2, 3' and 4 this equals 
00 
~B{a) = l Pr(p = p,r=0\a) = ^ 
p = 0 
ipi{p).a.v. n [1 - ipx{i).a..v\ 
2 = 0 
E E, 
p=0 
II [1 - ip^.a.v] 
ï = 0 
-(3.2) 
in which the product terms are one if p=0. By comparing equations (2.3), (2.4) 
and (3.2) it follows that the numerator in the r.h.s. of (3.2) equals one. Let 
t be the random variable denoting the duration of unemployment of individuals 
sampled in the inflow. The denominator in the r.h.s. of (3.2) equals the sum 
over all i>0 of Pr(t>t\a). It is easy to show that for a discrete nonnegative 
random variable t there holds that 
00 00 
£Pr(t>t) = £t.Pr(t = t) = E(t) 
t=i t=o 
Thus, 
2(a) = l/(E(t\a)+l) (3.3) 
which is positive by virtue of Assumption 3'. 
Proposit ion 1. Let Assumptions 1, 2, 3' and 4 be satisfied. If there is no 
state dependence then 9(0\a)fê(a) does nat depend on a. In that case this 
ratio is larger than or equal to one. 
Proof. If there is no state dependence then t\a,v has a geometrie distribution 
with parameter 1^(0).a.t>. Consequently, E(£|a) = Ev(E(t\a,v)) = 
Ev((l-^1(0).a.i;)/(^i(0).a.t;)), so 3(a) = ^(OJ.a/E^l/i;). (Note that EV(1/Ü)<OO 
by virtue of Assumption 3'.) Combining this with (3.1) gives 
6J^± = Ev(v).Ev(l/v) 
V(a) 
which does not depend on a and which by virtue of Jensen's inequality is 
larger than or equal to one. D 
Jackman & Layard (1991) were the first to argue that in the absence of 
state dependence 0(01a)f'B(a) does not depend on o. Their exposition is more 
intuitive than above. For example, Assumption 4 is not mentioned. Also, they 
do not state the link between ~B{a) and E(t\a). This link will turn out to be 
useful for the extensions in Subsection 3.4. 
As Jackman & Layard (1991) argue, from the result above it follows that if 
8(0\a)/d(a) does depend on a (i.e. varies between steady states) then there 
must be state dependence. It is clear that the attractiveness of a test based 
on this depends on the extent to which the reverse holds as well. We will 
examine this in detail. In the general model, the ratio 9(0\a)fë(a) does not 
depend on a if and only if a(E(t\a)+l) does not depend on a. Recall that 
E(i|a)+1 equals the denominator of the r.h.s. of (3.2). The derivative of 
a(E(t\a)+l) w.r.t. a equals 
E(t+l|o) + a.Ev 
00 t-.l t - \ 
E E -Vi(k).v . n [1 - ^(i).a.v] 
L ( = 1 fc=0 j = 0 
which can be rewritten as 
00 t - \ 
v E \ {t+l).ipx(t).a.v -- E 
t = 0 fc = 0 
ip1(k).a.v 
l-ip1(k).a.v 
t - ï 
II [1 - P^.a.v] \ (3.4) 
J
 i = 0 
in which the second summation is zero if t=0. If the term in square brackets 
in (3.4) is positive (negative) for every t>0 and every possible v and a then 
the whole expression (3.4) is positive (negative). In that case 9(0\a)/V{a) is 
strictly increasing (decreasing) in a. The conditions on the term in square 
brackets can be translated into conditions on the Vi function, given v and a. 
If the length of the unit time period approaches zero then these conditions 
become more transparent. For the limiting case we obtain the strong results 
listed in Proposition 2 below. In this proposition, IFRA and DFRA stand for 
Increasing Failure Rate Average and Decreasing Failure Rate Average, 
respectively (see e.g. Hollander & Proschan (1984); their definitions are 
stated in the proof of Proposition 2). 
Proposition 2. Consider the continuous - time analogue of the model satisfying 
Assumptions 1, 2, 3' and 4 in which 6(0\a) exists and is positive. 
(i) The ratio d(0\a)fó(a) does not change with a on <0,oc» if and only if 
there is no state dependence. 
(ii) If ipi(t) as a hazard rate is strictly IFRA {for which it is sufficiënt 
that ip-i(t) is strictly increasing) then d(0\a)/~9(a) is strictly 
increasing in a. 
(iii) If ip\{t) as a hazard rate is strictly DFRA (for which it is sufficiënt 
that ipi(t) is strictly decreasing) then 9(0\a)/9~(a) is strictly 
decreasing in a. 
Proof. In continuous time, 9(t\T,v), 9{t\r) etc. are rates rather than 
probabilities. Equation (3.1) still holds while (3.3) is replaced by 
~B(a) = 1/E(£|a) (3.5) 
(this can be inferred from for example Heekman Sz Singer (1984) and Ridder 
(1984)). According to Lancaster (1990), the only continuous-time MPH model for 
which E(t\a) is multiplicative in a is the model in which the baseline hazard 
V>i follows a Weibull specification: tp^t) = atCi~ , with Ckoxoo. The only a for 
which aE(t\a) does not depend on a is oc=l (which incidentally is the only a 
for which 0<ö(0|a)«x>). This means that ipx is constant, so there is no state 
dependence. 
It can be shown that the continuous-time equivalent of (3.4) (which is the 
derivative of aE(t\a)) equals 
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tyi(0 
t 1 
- jtp^u^u 
0 
. .E„ < a-y.expj-a-y.JV^uJditV >• dt 
If the term in square brackets is positive (negative) for every t>0 then the 
expression above is positive (negative) for every a. In that case 0(01a)/~8(a) 
is strictly increasing (decreasing) in a. The term in square brackets is 
positive for every t>0 if and only if the distribution of t\a,v nas strictly 
IFRA, or, in other words, if tp^t) as a hazard rate has the "strictly IFRA" 
property. Sufficiënt for this is that the distribution of t\a,v has strictly 
IFR (increasing failure rate), or, in other words, that y^t) is strictly 
increasing. Similarly, the term in square brackets is negative for every t>0 
if and only if the distribution of t\a,v has strictly DFRA. For the latter it 
suffices that ipx(t) is strictly decreasing. D 
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Somewhat loosely, one might translate IFRA as "a faiiure rate (here: 
Vi(t)) which is increasing in most points and never strongly decreasing" and 
DFRA analogously. Proposition 2 suggests the following practical guidelines. 
First, if one does not want to rule out that Vi(0 is strongly increasing at 
some t and strongly decreasing at other t, then one should use as many steady 
states a as possible when examining the behaviour of 0(01a)/0~(a). Secondly, if 
it is known that state dependence is almost monotone, then comparing two 
steady states suffices, because then for any a^a2 there holds that 
0(O|a1)/#(a1) ?t 0(O|a2)/0~(a2). So, the eyeball test discussed in this 
subsection has very high power against monotone state dependence. Thirdly, if 
state dependence is known to be monotone, then the eyeball test is informative 
on the sign of the state dependence. For example, if 0(O|a)/0"(a) for the 
steady state with high 9(0\a) is smaller than 0(O|a)/0"(a) for the steady state 
with low 9(0ja), then there is negative state dependence (meaning that the 
exit probability out of unemployment for a given individual decreases as a 
function of unemployment duration). Instead of using 9(0\a) one may also use 
~B{a) in this relationship, since both are increasing in the value of a (for 
U(a) this follows from equations (3.2) and (3.3)). 
We finish this subsection by examining intuitively the fundamental idea 
underlying the eyeball test on state dependence. For ease of exposition, let 
time be continuous. If there is no state dependence then t\a,v has an 
exponential distribution with constant exit rate ^(OJ.av, so the expectation 
of t conditional on a and v is proportional to l/a and to l/v. Thus, the 
expectation conditional on a only is proportional to l/a. This is exploited in 
the test (by multiplying the expectation with a term 0(0|a) that is always 
proportional to a). Equation (3.5) expresses E(t\a) in terms of a quantity 
0~(a) that can readily be observed in aggregate data even if 9(t\a) is not 
observed for every t separately. (See Jackman k Layard (1991) for a direct 
intuitive explanation of the f act that #(a) is proportional to a if there is 
no state dependence.) In discrete time, the argument is analogous. The test 
exploits the f act that E(t\a,v)+l is proportional to l/a and l/v if there is 
no state dependence. 
3.2. Examining the cross effect of t and a in the logarithm of the observed 
exit probability, log 0(i|a). 
Budd, Levine & Smith (1988) and Jackman k Layard (1991) present and use 
another eyeball test for state dependence (see also Layard, Nickell k Jackman 
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(1991)). This test is based on the behaviour of the observed exit probability 
as a function of duration in different steady states. Specifically, as shown 
beiow, it examines the sign of the cross effect of t and a in the observed log 
exit probability log 9{t\a). Or, in terms of a continuous-time model, it 
examines the sign of the cross-derivative of log 9(t\a) w.r.t. t and a. In 
this subsection we show that these statistics are not informative on the 
presence of state dependence. By implication, the corresponding eyeball test 
has unattractave properties. In contrast, we will argue that the behaviour of 
the cross effect is informative on the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. 
In Subsection 3.3 we present an eyeball test on unobserved heterogeneity 
exploiting this. 
Like in Subsection 3.2 we have to adopt Assumptions 1, 2, 3' and 4. Budd, 
Levine h Smith (1988) in addition assume that v has a discrete distribution 
with a finite number of points of support. 
Budd, Levine k Smith (1988) and Jackman & Layard (1991) state that if 
there is no state dependence then, when comparing a steady state with a small 
a to one with a large a, the proportionate difference between the exit 
probabilities is smaller for a high duration than it is for a low duration. 
Given the statements in those papers that a large a 'implies large observed 
exit probabilities at all durations, the main statement can be formalized as 
follows: if there is no state dependence then 
d l Q g d ^ l f f i ) < d l ° g d ^ i l a > for all a and all t2>tl>0 (3.6) 
So, if for particular ax<a2 and tx<t2 it is found empirically that 
d(h\a2)I^(t2\ai) > ö(J1|a2)/ö(f1|a1) then the argument goes that there must 
be state dependence. 
Note that (3.6) basically states that the cross effect of t and a in 
log 6{t\a) is negative, given that both derivatives appearing in (3.6) are 
positive. In a continuous-time model, (3.6) is virtually the same as stating 
that the cross-derivative of log 9(t\a) w.r.t. t and a is negative everywhere 
(i.e. d \og9(t\a)/dadt < 0), given that both derivatives appearing in (3.6) 
are positive. 
The easiest way to show that (3.6) and related statements on the signs of 
derivatives are incorrect is by giving counter-examples. 
Discrete distributions of unobserved heterogeneity with two points of support. 
From equation (3.1) it follows that dlog0(£|a)/da at t=0 equals l/a. We assume 
that G{v) is such that Pr{v = v1) = p = l-Pr(v = v2) with 0<p<l and 0<ux<t;2. There 
11 
is no state dependence and we normalize tpi(t) to one. Thus, 8(t\a,v) = av and 
we need v2<l/a. By substituting ip2(T)-ai ^i( f)=l a n d G{v) into (2.4) and 
differentiating log 9(t\a) w.r.t. a we obtain 
I _ p(l-p)(v1-v2)2 .t.{l-av1)t'1(l-av2) ' "x ( 3 J ) 
[pv 1 ( l - av 1 ) t + ( l - y ) i ; 2(1-^^2) ' ] . [p(l-<M>! ) £ + ( l - p ) ( l - a v 2 ) t ] 
First note that for every t>0 this is smaller than l/a. By working out the 
product of the terms in square brackets in (3.7) and by dividing numerator and 
denominator by ( 1 - a ü J ~ (l-av2) ~ , it follows that when £-»oo then (3.7) goes 
to l/a. Thus, the value of dlog#(£|a)/da as i-»oo equals the value at J=0, 
implying that this derivative is not a monotone function of t. 
Intuitively, it is plausible that when G(v) is discrete then, as t-*x>, 
ó\og9(t\a)/da goes to its value at J=0. When t increases, the group of 
unemployed becomes increasingly more homogeneous, since the individuals with 
large v leave unemployment on average earlier than the individuals with small 
v. In the limit, the group is homogeneous (all remaining individuals have the 
smallest v) so the value of d\og8(t\a)/óa equals the value in a model without 
unobserved heterogeneity. This in turn equals the value in a model with 
unobserved heterogeneity at t=Q, because at t=0 the selection due to 
heterogeneity has not yet taken place. 
Suppose a=l, p=l/2, vx=l/5 and v2=3/5. The solid line in Figure 1 depicts 
dlogö(i|a)/da as a function of t. For clarity we plot this function for 
integer as well as non-integer values of t. First note that this derivative is 
positive for every t>0. Thus, in the neighbourhood of a=l , larger a imply 
larger observed exit probabilities at all durations. Secondly, this derivative 
is decreasing in t only for £<2.6. So, when comparing a steady state with a 
relatively small a to one with a relatively large a, the proportionate 
difference between the exit probabilities is larger for large t than it is for 
£ close to 3. Figure 2 plots 6{t\a) for two different values of a, namely a=l 
and a=1.35. Clearly, the proportionate difference gets larger when t increases 
from 2 onwards. If a=1.35 then the initial exit probability is high, causing 
most individuals with v=v2 to leave unemployment before t=2. As a result, the 
group of individuals who are unemployed at t=2 is almost homogeneous, so the 
exit probability is almost constant afterwards. If a=l then at t—2 there are 
still many unemployed individuals with v=v2, so the dynamic selection due to 
heterogeneity continues after t—2. 
Figure 3 shows the same phenomenon in a style similar to the figures in 
Jackman & Layard (1991). It plots log 9{t\a) separately for £=0,1,..,5, as 
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continuous functions of a. According to the previously mentioned papers, the 
distances between the lines should increase as a increases. Clearly, that is 
not what happens. 
In the examples considered so far, dlog9(t\a)/èa is positive for every 
t>0. However, contrary to what is stated in the previously mentioned papers, 
this is not a general property of the model. Consider again the discrete 
distribution for v with p=l/2, ^=1 /5 and i>2=3/5. Take a=1.5 (note that v2<l/c 
so this is an admissible value for a). The dashed line in Figure 1 dep iets 
dlogO(t\a)/da as a function of t. It is negative for t=\. Intuitively, a is so 
large that most individuals with v=v2 leave unemployment at t=0. The drop in 
the mean value of v among the unemployed when going from t=0 to t=l is so 
large that its negative effect on 6{l\a) is not offset by the positive effect 
of the increase of a. This means that in a model without state dependence, the 
lines in graphs like Figure 2 can actually cross. In sum, it is not true for 
all durations that in a "good" steady state (i.e. with a large a) the observed 
exit probability is larger than in a "bad" steady state. D 
Clearly, because of this, the "cross effect" eyeball test for state 
dependence proposed and used by Budd, Levine & Smith (1988) and Jackman & 
Layard (1991) has unattractive properties. Incidentally, it should however be 
noted that in the empirical analysis in Jackman & Layard (1991) both eyeball 
tests for state dependence give the same result. 
The topic of this subsection can be related to a statement in Lancaster 
(1979) on cross effects in MPH models. Lancaster (1979) analyzes 
continuous-time models in which a term x depending on fixed observed 
explanatory variables replaces a (so 9(t\x,v) = y^tj.x.v). He proves that if 
G(v) belongs to the Gamma family then, for any function ^ ( ï ) , the 
cross-derivative of log 9(t\x) w.r.t. t and x is always negative. In this 
result, the Gamma condition cannot be generalized to include all possible 
G(v). If v has the discrete distribution with two points of support used in 
the numerical example above, and •^1(t)=l, then the cross-derivative of log 
9(t\x) w.r.t. t and x equals zero if t.x = 4.61 and it is positive if and only 
if t.x > 4.61. Other counterexamples can be constructed by using discrete 
distributions with more points of support or uniform distributions with 
support [CQ,^] with 0<c0<c1<oo. In any case, the general result for the Gamma 
heterogeneity model implies that even if there is strong and monotone state 
dependence then the cross-derivative of log 9(t\x) w.r.t. t and x can be 
negative for every t>0 and x>0. This strengthens the conclusion above that the 
"cross effect" eyeball test for state dependence has unattractive properties. 
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We will now argue intuitively that examining the cross effect is 
informative on the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (rather than state 
dependence). For ease of exposition, let time be continuous. Suppose that 
there is unobserved heterogeneity and that there are no cross effects of t and 
a in the observed log exit probability log 9(t\a). Then 6(t\a) is 
multiplicative in t and a. But then the model is observationally equivalent to 
a model without unobserved heterogeneity (with 9(t\a,v) = tpx(t).a), which 
violates the nonparametric identifiability of the MPH model (see Eibers fe 
Ridder (1982) and Van den Berg (1992)). Consequently, if there is unobserved 
heterogeneity then there are cross effects of t and a in log 6(t\a) and vice 
versa, for any type of state dependence, and indeed G(v) is identified from 
these cross effects. In the next subsection we exploit this. 
3.3. Van den Berg &: Van Ours (1993)'s "long-term/short-term" eyeball test for 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
For this eyeball test there is no gain in adopting Assumptions 3' or 4. The 
test is based on examining the cross effect of t and calendar time r on the 
observed log exit probability log 9(t\r). For practical reasons it turns out 
to be more convenient to describe the test as a comparison of values of ratios 
9(t\r)/9(t-l\T) for one calendar time point to the values for other calendar 
time points. We use the name in the heading of this subsection to distinguish 
the test from the "cross effect" eyeball test of the previous subsection. 
It is clear that, for a test based on cross effects to be sensible, 9(t\r) 
has to vary over calendar time. This is guaranteed by Assumption 3. Note that 
it is straightforward to verify whether •^2( ri)^2( r2) f ° r rv£ri-> since 
equation (2.4) implies that V>2(ri)AMr2) = 0(°l r i)/#(o lT2)! a n c l t n e latter 
ratio can be observed. 
Proposition 3. Let Assumptions 1, 2 and 3 be satisfied. If there is no 
unobserved heterogeneity then 9(t\T)/9(t-l\r) does not depend on r for any 
fe{l ,2 , . .} . Further, if there is unobserved heterogeneity then 9(1\T)/9{0\T) 
depends on r in the sense that whenever •#>2(ri-l)?£'#'2('r2-l) {which is true for 
at least some rx and r2) then 9(1\T1)/9(0\TÏ) ^ 0(l |r2)/0(O|r2). 
Proof. If there is no unobserved heterogeneity then Pr(v = /j,1) = l and 
9(t\T)=9(t\T,v)=ipl(t).tp2(T).[il. Consequently, 9(t\r)/9(t-l\T) = Vi(0M(*-l) 
which does not depend on r. It remains to prove that if there is unobserved 
heterogeneity then 9{1\T)/9(0\T) does depend on r in the sense described 
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above. From equation (2.4) it follows that 
g ( l | r ) _ ^ i ( l ) l - ? i ( 0 ) - V a ( r - l ) - A * 2 / M i „ . , 
WM ~ Vi(0) • l - V i ( O ) . ^ ( r - l ) . ^ . ^ 
The derivative of the r.h.s. of (3.8) w.r.t. i/)2(r-l) is proportional to ^~ii2. 
There is unobserved heterogeneity if and only if Wa,v(v)>0, i.e. if and only if 
//2>/^i- So, 9(1\T)/9{0\T) is a non-constant monotone decreasing function of 
ip2(r-l) if and only if there is unobserved heterogeneity. Recall that by 
Assumption 3, ip2(r-l) varies over r. (As we have seen, it is easy to detect rx 
and r2 for which V,2(ri)?t^2('r2)0 D 
From Proposition 3 it follows that if there is a ïe{l,2,..} such that 
9(t\T)/9(t-l\T) does depend on r (i.e. varies over r) then there must be 
unobserved heterogeneity. Further, for t=l the reverse is also true, i.e. if 
0 ( 1 | T ) / 0 ( O | T ) . does not depend on r then there is no unobserved heterogeneity. 
These insights were first developed and used by Van den Berg & Van Ours 
(1993). 
From Proposition 3 it follows that in principle it suffices to examine 
8(1\T)/9(0\T). In practice one may prefer examining ratios of other observed 
exit probabilities as well. Unfortunately, for te{2,3,..} it is not true for 
all possible structural functions tpi(t), i>2(T) an<^ G(v) that if 
ö ( * l r i ) / ö ( * - l | r i ) = ö(f | r2) /0<«-l | r2) for some TUT2 with 
•ö(*|r1-t+i)?tö(ïjT2-t+i) for all ie{0,l,..,«}, that then there is no unobserved 
heterogeneity. Suppose we observe steady states. The logarithm of the ratio 
9(t \a)/9(t-l\a) can be thought as the discrete-time equivalent of the 
derivative of log 8{t\a) w.r.t. t. It follows from Subsection 3.2 that it is 
possible to have a situation in which there is unobserved heterogeneity and in 
which the derivative of log 9{t\a) w.r.t. t is a non-monotone function of a. 
Thus, for a given f, there may be different values of a generating the same 
value of 9{t\a)/9(t-l\a). For example, if G(v) is discrete with Pr(v = 1/5) = 
1/2 = l-Pr(v = 3/5), then 0(2|a=1.15)/0(l|a=1.15) = 0(2|a=1.448)/0(l|a=1.448). 
However, if additional values of a or t are used then there is no ambiguity 
anymore. 
Indeed, from extensive numerical analyses based on particular ipi(t), ip2{r) 
and G(v) it follows that if there is unobserved heterogeneity then in most 
cases 9(t\T1)/9{t-l\T1) ^ ö ( f | r 2 ) / ö ( t - l | r 2 ) when 9(i\Tx-t+i)^9{i\T2-t+i) for 
all ie{0,l,..,i}. Thus, it seems that in practice one may safely use ratios 
9(t\T)/9{t-l\T) with £e{2,3,..} for eyeball tests as well. 
Van den Berg (1992) addresses the issue of the previous paragraphs for the 
15 
continuous-time analogue of the model satisfying Assumptions 1, 2 and 3' (i.e. 
the case in which there are steady states characterized by ip2(r)=a) under the 
assumption that the data contain a continuüm of different values of a. Unlike 
Proposition 2 above, it is not obvious to what extent the results in Van den 
Berg (1992) can be regarded as good approximations of results for the 
discrete-time model with a small unit time period. Therefore they are not 
discussed in detail here. Basically, it turns out that it is very unlikely to 
have a situation in which there is unobserved heterogeneity and in which there 
are t^t2 and a^a2 for which ö(i1|a1)/ö(f2|ffli) = ö(«1|a2)/ö(t2la2)> if ai an<^ 
a2 can be (and are) chosen randomly from an interval of real numbers. 
As noted before, we are able to identify the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity from the cross effects of t and r in log 9(t\r). State 
dependence and calendar time dependence are identified from the separate 
additive effects of t and r in log 8{t\r) (or, in other words, multiplicative 
effects in 6(t\T)}. From this it is clear that the MPH assumption is crucial 
for identification of the structural functions. The proof of Proposition 3 
provides a test on this assumption. From this proof it follows that 
9{1\T)/8(0\T) cannot be increasing as a function of ip2(T-l). Thus, if the 
calendar time effect causes the exit probabilities to be small (e.g. in times 
of recession) then the aggregate exit probability falls less sharply when 
going from t=0 to t=l than if the opposite case holds. This is because in a 
recession the initial weeding out of individuals with a high quality (i.e. a 
large v) cannot occur as f ast as in the other case. Now suppose one observes 
that, for some rx and r2, ö(0 |r1- l )>ö(0|r2- l ) . This is equivalent to 
^2('ri_1)> '^2('r2_l)- K ^ is a l s o observed that ö(l |r1)/ö(0|r1) > 
0(l |r2)/0(O|r2) then that is evidence that the MPH assumption is violated. It 
can be shown that a wide range of alternative (i.e. non-MPH) models generate 
such observations (see Van den Berg & Van Ours (1993), Blanchard & Diamond 
(1990) and Layard, Nickell k Jackman (1991)). 
Finally, the model specification can also be tested by examining whether 
the results of different eyeball tests of the same hypothesis are in 
accordance to each other. 
3.4. Extensions. 
We start this subsection by examining whether alternative eyeball tests for 
state dependence can be derived under Assumptions 1, 2, 3' and 4. First of 
all, note that if 9{t\a) is observed for every ie{0,l,...} then E{t\a) can be 
calculated. Consequently, when applying Proposition 1, ~B~{a) can be replaced by 
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l/(E(£|a)+l). Along the lines of for example Heekman &: Singer (1984) and 
Ridder (1984) it can be shown that in the stock of unemployed individuals the 
probabüity that the elapsed duration p is zero is equal to l/(E(t|a)+l) as 
well (so Pr{p = 0\a) = l/(E(£|a)+l)). Consequently, if the distribution of p\a 
in the stock of unemployed is observed then, when applying Proposition 1, D(a) 
can also be replaced by Pr(p = 0\a). 
For ease of exposition we will for the moment take time to be continuous. 
Remember from Subsection 3.1 that the fundamental idea underlying Jackman Sz 
Layard (1991)'s "stock/flow" eyeball test is that E(t\a,v) is proportional to 
l/a and l/v if there is no state dependence. In the latter case there also 
k k k 
holds that E(J \a,v) (if existent) is proportional to l/a and l/v . This 
suggests that by using higher moments of t\a,v other eyeball tests can be 
2 
derived. Consider E(f \a,v). If there is no state dependence then this equals 
2 2 2 2 2 
2/(a v ). So, in that case, E(i |a) = 2Ez,(l/v )/a and 
lE(t2\a) _ lEv(lfv2) , . 
2' E{t\a) ~ o" E^ l /ü ) [ ' 
which is proportional to l/a. Thus, this can be used for an eyeball test. For 
example, if there is no state dependence then E(ï |a)/E {t\a) does not depend 
on a. According to Heekman & Singer (1984), the l.h.s. of (3.9) is equal to 
E(p|a) in the stock of unemployed. So, an alternative formulation of the test 
examines E(p\a)/E(t\a). Unfortunately, the test derived in this paragraph does 
not satisfy the analogue of Proposition 2. In particular, if there is Weibull 
d—1 2 2 
state dependence (ipi{t) = at ) then E(t \a)/E {t\a) does not depend on a. So 
it seems that the test of this paragraph is less attractive than Jackman h 
Layard (1991 )'s "stock/flow" test. 
We now outline how the eyeball tests could be transformed to formal 
statistical tests for continuous-time models to be estimated with micro 
duration data. Suppose there is no calendar time dependence but that instead 
there are fixed explanatory variables x. In such analysis, 9{t\x) is not 
observed and must be estimated. The estimation method determines the 
asymptotic distributions of test statistics like 
ö(0|x1)E(t|x1) - 0(O|x2)E(*|x2) 
for a test on state dependence (note that E(t|x) depends on the whole function 
9(t\x) as a function of t) or 
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0(*il*i)/Ö(*2l*i) " ö(*i|af2)/ö(«a|x2) 
for a test on unobserved heterogeneity. In practice it may be hard to estimate 
9(t\x) nonparametrically for t close to zero, since zero is the boundary of 
the support of t. 
4. Empirical illustration. 
4.1. The data. 
In this section we apply the eyeball tests presented in Subsections 3.1 and 
3.3 to data from France, the UK and The Netherlands. The primary aim is here 
to illustrate the use of these tests in an empirical setting, rather than to 
give detailed analyses of the labour markets in these countries. 
For the eyeball tests two indicators are important, a state dependence and 
an unobserved heterogeneity indicator. The state dependence indicator 
0(0]a)l~8{a) from Subsection 3.1 refers to steady state periods a. Below we 
discuss the characteristics of these periods and how to find them empirically. 
For the moment we define the state dependence indicator for every calendar 
time point r as the ratio of the exit probability for the first duration class 
and the over-all exit probability, both at time r: 0(O|r)/0"(r). The term 0~(r) 
can be expressed in a way similar to 5(a) in equation (3.2). 
From Subsection 3.3 it follows that ratios of exit probabilities for 
different duration classes are informative on the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity. For sake of brevity we mainly restrict attention to exit 
probabilities for the first two duration classes. (Recall the attractive 
properties of 0(l|r)/0(O]r). Also, data on exit probabilities for the first 
duration classes are in general more reliable than those for high duration 
classes.) So, we define the unobserved heterogeneity indicator as the ratio 
0(l |r)/0(O|r) of the exit probabilities for the second and first duration 
class, both at time r. 
To investigate the behaviour of both indicators, we need observations on 
exit probabilities. As noted above, we need time series information on 
aggregate numbers of unemployed individuals, distinguished by their elapsed 
duration (class). The frequency in which calendar time information is 
available has to be the same as the measurement scale in which the duration 
classes are available. Let U{t\r) denote the number of unemployed in duration 
class t at time r. The exit probability for individuals in duration class t at 
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time r equals 
9(t\T)= { U(t\T) - U(t+l\T+l) ] I U(t\T) 
For our analyses we use quarterly data. We have inforrnation on the number 
of unemployed in the first three quarterly duration classes and on the total 
number of unemployed at time r (t/(r)). We measure the over-all exit 
probability from unemployment at time r as: 
2(r)= [ U(T) - U(T+1) + f/(0|r+l) ] / U(T) 
So, we implicitly assume that the inflow into unemployment at time r+1 is 
equal to the number of unemployed in the first duration class at time r+1. In 
a discrete-time framework, this seems to be the most straightforward way to 
estimate the inflow size. See Jackman & Layard (1991) for an alternative 
approach. To eliminate seasonal fluctuations we use four quarterly moving 
averages of exit probabilities. 
Ideally, aggregate data provide exact values of exit probabilities. In 
reality, observations may differ from the values as predicted from the model 
because of measurement and specification errors. We assume somewhat loosely 
that the latter kind of errors do not dominate and that they are unsystematic. 
An advantage of eyeball tests is that they can be used in situations in which 
it is not aimed to construct and estimate formal models for these errors, or 
in situations in which informal data analyses are desired prior to more formal 
analyses. 
We use data from three countries: France, the UK and The Netherlands. (It 
turned out to be impossible to obtain data meeting our requirements from a 
number of other European countries.) For each country we distinguish between 
male and female unemployed workers. The calendar time periods for which we 
have inforrnation cover a large part of the 1980s and the beginning of the 
1990s (see Table 1). The French and Dutch data are collected by public 
employment offices and refer to registered unemployment. The UK data refer to 
benefit claimants. 
Table 1 also lists averages of the over-all quarterly exit probability as 
well as the exit probabilities for the first and second quarterly duration 
class. Comparing the over-all exit probability with the exit probabilities for 
the first two duration classes is informative about the way the exit 
probability changes over the duration of unemployment. For example, if the 
over-all exit probability is smaller than those for the first two duration 
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classes, then the exit probability declines after the first two quarters of 
unemployment. 
The state dependence eyeball test compares different steady states. So, we 
have to find (at least) two steady state periods. In a steady state of 
unemployment, the stock, inflow and outflow are constant over a period of 
time. This means that we have to find two periods of time during which at 
least the over-all exit probability out of unemployment is more or less 
constant. The length of the period of time during which stability is required 
depends on the average unemployment duration. If the average unemployment 
duration is short, the length of the required stability period is short too. 
Taking the inverse of the over-all exit probability as an indicator for 
the average duration of unemployment, we find substantial differences between 
countries. The average duration of unemployment in The Netherlands is 5 
quarters and in France and the UK 3 quarters. 
Figure 4 shows the development of the over-all exit probabilities out of 
unemployment. Note that the range of values on the horizontal axis and the 
length of the range of values on the vertical axis are the same in each graph. 
On the basis of these graphs we define the steady state periods indicated in 
Table 2. In general, the length of the steady state periods is about 2-4 times 
as long as the average unemployment duration, which seems reasonable. It 
should be noted that the results are insensitive with respect to the exact 
location of the steady state periods. 
4.2. Eyeball tests on state dependence. 
The eyeball test for state dependence compares the values of the state 
dependence indicators for different steady states. Figure 5 shows the 
development of the state dependence indicator for each country and gender. 
Here, as well as in Figure 6, we use the rule that the length of the range of 
values on the vertical axis is the same for each of the six groups, and is 
equal to the largest of the six observed ranges. In addition, we merged the 
graphs for both genders per country. As a result, the length of the range on 
the vertical axis for The Netherlands exceeds the length for the other two 
countries. The range on the horizontal axis is the same for each picture. 
For British females the difference between the values of the indicator in 
different steady states is small, while for the other groups the opposite is 
true. We conclude that state dependence occurs for British males and French 
and Dutch males and females. 
Proposition 2 in Subsection 3.1 suggests that if state dependence is known 
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to be monotone, then a negative (positive) relationship between the state 
dependence indicator and the over-all exit probability implies that there is 
negative (positive) state dependence. From Figures 4 and 5 we infer a positive 
relation for the Dutch and French unemployed, indicating positive state 
dependence. For the British male unemployed we find a negative relation, 
indicating negative duration dependence. For British females the state 
dependence indicator is fairly constant over calendar time, so there is no 
obvious relation to the level of the over-all exit probability. The results 
are summarized in Table 2. 
We have also investigated the sign of the relation more formally by 
calculating the correlation coefficients between the state dependence 
indicators and the over-all exit probabilities, using data from the steady 
state periods only. The results are shown in the first two columns of Table 3. 
They are in accordance to those in Table 2. For British females, however, the 
correlation coëfficiënt is significantly negative. It may be that for this 
group there is negative state dependence, but that the decrease of the exit 
probability over the duration of unemployment is small. In a way, this 
inconclusiveness illustrates the limitations of the eyeball tests. In the 
absence of a formal statistical framework it is not possible to infer the 
presence of small but significant effects. 
It should be stressed again that the results on the sign of the state 
dependence are conditional on the assumption of monotone state dependence. 
There are theoretical as well as empirical indications that under certain 
circumstances non-monotone state dependence may be important (see Devine & 
Kiefer (1991), Van den Berg (1991) and Van den Berg & Van Ours (1994) and the 
references in those papers). 
4.3. Eyeball tests on unobserved heterogeneity 
The eyeball test for unobserved heterogeneity examines the behaviour of the 
heterogeneity indicator over calendar time. This test does not depend on 
steady state assumptions. From Figure 6 it is obvious that unobserved 
heterogeneity is important in the French and Dutch unemployment duration data. 
In the British data, unobserved heterogeneity does not seem to be important. 
It turns out that for France and The Netherlands the indicators 
9(t\T)/9(t-l\T) with t>2 (not reported here) lead to the same conclusion as 
the indicator graphed in Figure 6. For the UK, however, the former indicators 
suggest the presence of unobserved heterogeneity. This difference in outcome 
between eyeball tests for the same phenomenon suggests that the model 
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specification may be incorrect for UK unemployment durations. This is 
confirmed below. 
As shown in Subsection 3.3, the heterogeneity indicator can also be used 
for testing the MPH assumption. In particular, a positive relation between 
this indicator and the - one period lagged - exit probability for the first 
duration class suggests that the MPH assumption is violated. 
We have investigated this by calculating the correlation coëfficiënt over 
the sample period between the heterogeneity indicator and the lagged exit 
probability for the first duration class. (For sake of brevity we dot not 
present the corresponding graphs.) Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 show the results 
of these calculations. For France and The Netherlands we find a significant 
negative relationship, confirming the model specification. For the UK the 
correlation is significantly positive. Therefore, for the UK the MPH 
assumption is violated. This casts doubt on the results of the other eyeball 
tests in this paper for the UK. 
In a companion paper, Van den Berg Sz Van Ours (1994) formally estimate 
models for exit probabilities for different duration classes, using similar 
data. Almost all of their results are in agreement to those presented here. 
For The Netherlands they find that state dependence is non-monotonic. 
5. Conclusion. 
In this paper we have examined eyeball tests for state dependence and 
unobserved heterogeneity in aggregate duration data. We have shown that the 
test on state dependence proposed by Jackman Sz Layard (1991) and the test on 
unobserved heterogeneity based on Van den Berg & Van Ours (1993) have 
excellent properties in terms of the power against the corresponding 
alternative hypothesis. 
The eyeball tests do not rely on parametric assumptions on the 
determinants of the hazard. This is a marked advantage. It makes the test for 
state dependence (unobserved heterogeneity) insensitive to the shape of the 
unobserved heterogeneity distribution (state dependence). The tests are based 
on the f acts that (i) if there is no state dependence then the mean duration 
is inversely proportional to the steady-state impact parameter in the exit 
probabilities, and (ii) if there is no unobserved heterogeneity then the 
observed exit probabilities are multiplicative in terms of duration and 
calendar time. 
We also showed that another eyeball test for state dependence, proposed by 
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Budd, Levine k Smith (1988) and Jackman & Layard (1991), may well reject the 
null hypothesis of no state dependence even if there is no state dependence, 
and vice versa. This is because this eyeball test is based on cross effects of 
unemployment duration and calendar time in the observed log exit probability, 
and these cross effects are informative on the presence of unobserved 
heterogeneity rather than state dependence. 
As an empirical illustration, we applied the eyeball tests to aggregate 
unemployment duration data from three European countries: France, the ÜK and 
The Netherlands. The data are quarterly and distinguish between males and 
females. The results indicate that in general there is state dependence in 
unemployment. Under the assumption of monotonicity of state dependence, we 
find positive state dependence for the French and Dutch unemployed and 
negative state dependence for British male unemployed. There is no strong 
indication of state dependence for the British female unemployed. Furthermore, 
unobserved heterogeneity is important in the French and Dutch unemployment 
data, while it is not an important phenomenon in the British data. 
Finally, our paper provides eyeball tests of the Mixed Proportional Hazard 
model framework. For British data this test results in rejection, which casts 
doubt on the results of the other eyeball tests for the UK. 
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Table 1. Data periods and statistics. 
Exit probabilities (%) 
Males Females 
Country Data period ~8{T) 9(0\T) B(1\T) S(T) 6(0\r) 0(1\T) 
France 1983.4-92.1 31 38 34 26 32 30 
UK 1984.3-92.2 27 42 32 34 46 34 
Netherlands 1982.1-91.4 20 32 32 20 26 28 
Table 2. Steady state periods and results of the eyeball test on state 
dependence. 
Steady state Steady state Eyeball test on state dependence 
Country with low with high Presence Sign (monotone) 
exit prob. exit prob. Males Females Males Females 
France 
UK 
Netherlands 
1984.2-86.4 
1984.3-87.1 
1985.2-87.2 
1987.4-90.4 
1989.4-90.4 
1988.4-91.4 
yes yes 
yes no 
yes yes 
+ 
+ 
+ 
0 
+ 
Table 3. Correlation coefficients. 
Informative on sign 
(monotone) state dependence 
Males Females 
.«) Informative on MPH assumption" 
Males Females 
,*) 
France 0.90 
UK -0.98 
Netherlands 0.87 
0.76 
-0.98 
0.95 
-0.85 -0.83 
0.75 0.65 
•0.93 -0.97 
Note: ail correlation coefficients differ significantly from zero at 1% level. 
a) Correlation between the state dependence indicator and the over-all exit 
probability in steady state periods. The sign corresponds to the sign of the 
monotone state dependence. 
b) Correlation between the heterogeneity indicator and the lagged exit 
probability for the first duration class in the total data period. A positive 
sign corresponds to a misspecified model. 
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Figure 1. The derivative of log 9(t\a) w.r.t. a as a function of t, for a=l 
and a=1.5, in the example of Subsection 3.2. 
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Figure 2. The observed exit probability 9(t\a) as a function of t, for a=l 
and a=1.35, in the example of Subsection 3.2. 
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Figure 3. The observed exit probability 9{t\a) as a function of a, for E=0, 
t=l, t=2, t=3, £=4 and f=5, in the example of Subsection 3.2. 
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Figure 4. Over-all exit probabilities; 3 countries. 
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Figure 5. Indicators state dependence; 3 countries. 
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Figure 6. Indicators unobserved heteroqeneitv; 3 countries. 
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